Loss of agency in apraxia by PAZZAGLIA, Mariella & GALLI, GIULIA
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
PERSPECTIVE ARTICLE
published: 23 September 2014
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00751
Loss of agency in apraxia
Mariella Pazzaglia1,2* and Giulia Galli2
1 Department of Psychology, University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’, Rome, Italy
2 IRCCS Fondazione Santa Lucia, Rome, Italy
Edited by:




Roy Salomon, École Polytechnique
Fédérale de Lausanne, Switzerland
Corrado Corradi-Dell’Acqua,
University of Geneva, Switzerland
*Correspondence:
Mariella Pazzaglia, Department of
Psychology, University of Rome ‘La




The feeling of acting voluntarily is a fundamental component of human behavior and social
life and is usually accompanied by a sense of agency. However, this ability can be impaired
in a number of diseases and disorders. An important example is apraxia, a disturbance
traditionally defined as a disorder of voluntary skillful movements that often results from
frontal-parietal brain damage. The first part of this article focuses on direct evidence of
some core symptoms of apraxia, emphasizing those with connections to agency and free
will. The loss of agency in apraxia is reflected in the monitoring of internally driven action,
in the perception of specifically self-intended movements and in the neural intention to
act. The second part presents an outline of the evidences supporting the functional and
anatomical link between apraxia and agency. The available structural and functional results
converge to reveal that the frontal–parietal network contributes to the sense of agency and
its impairment in disorders such as apraxia. The current knowledge on the generation of
motor intentions and action monitoring could potentially be applied to develop therapeutic
strategies for the clinical rehabilitation of voluntary action.
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EVIDENCE FOR THE LOSS OF SENSE OF AGENCY IN APRAXIA
The sense of agency implies the subjective experience of elabo-
ration, monitoring, and control of external events through one’s
own motor actions, as well as the neural intention to act. Using
cognitive neuroscience techniques, researchers have attempted to
elucidate this interesting phenomenon (Farrer et al., 2003b; David
et al., 2007; Spengler et al., 2009; Tsakiris et al., 2010; Salomon
et al., 2013; Weiss et al., 2014) distinguishing, at the conceptual
level, between two important aspects of agency: a retrospective
component (the outcome of action—objective) and prospective
signal (from the self-perception of generated actions to the inten-
tion to move—subjective) (Moore and Obhi, 2012; Chambon
et al., 2013). Agency research has attracted investigators and theo-
rists, although the mechanism appears very natural, critical voices
have questioned the validity of studying agency via conventional
scientific paradigms (David, 2012). An alternate approach is to
investigate how brain damage may alter the awareness of being
causally involved in an action (de Jong, 2011).
A prime neurological example is apraxia, a disturbance charac-
terized by a marked impairment in performing volitional move-
ments (de Jong, 2011; Dovern et al., 2011; Wolpe et al., 2014).
In essence, apraxia encompasses a broad spectrum of higher-
order purposeful movement disorders (Leiguarda and Marsden,
2000) that affect both sides of the body, even though neu-
rological damage is more frequently associated with unilateral
left frontal and parietal lesions (Haaland et al., 2000; Leiguarda
and Marsden, 2000; Hermsdörfer et al., 2003). The traditional
definition includes deficits in performing, imitating, and rec-
ognizing skilled actions known as meaningless or meaningful
gestures (Rothi and Heilman, 1984; Pazzaglia et al., 2008a,b). The
pathological condition is identified on the basis of an inability to
execute both transitive (using an object) and intransitive (without
an object) gestures with different body effectors (mouth, hand,
or foot) (Leiguarda and Marsden, 2000). This failure to move
intentionally cannot be explained by primary motor or sensory
impairments, or by deficits in memory or comprehension (De
Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988).
Apraxia has been, and is still, subject to intense debate about
its deficits to sensorimotor function and higher-level cognitive
processes (Goldenberg, 2013). In this perspective article, we will
discuss just one of the possible pathological perspectives of the
apraxic disturbance: whether the emerging concept of “agency”
is consistent with the presentation of neurological symptoms
due to apraxia. Distinct from other clinical disturbances such
as anosognosia for hemiplegia—where the symptom of disown-
ership (Karnath and Baier, 2010) with consequent disorders of
motor awareness of the paralyzed parts have been interpreted
in relation to agency (Pia et al., 2013)—the framework we
offer here specifically involves a more global and genuine action
volitional disorder that typically affects the two sides of the
body. Until recently, a limited number of experimental stud-
ies have identified the essential aspects of agency that can be
objectively quantified in apraxia by the following three lines of
evidence: (i) a genuine incapacity with respect to the volun-
tary control of one’s action bound closer to its outcome; (ii) a
disordered subjective experience of actions both performed and
not; and (iii) altered predictive signals generated during motor
planning.
The first evidence is related to the fundamental importance of
performing an intentional action with an outcome and, secondly,
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to the subjective sense of control in the selection of actions.
Consider, for example, the active action of taking a cigarette
from a pack, opening a book of matches, and then lighting
and drawing on the cigarette. A variety of movements may be
similarly effective when it comes to performing the given aim
of smoking. However, if an apraxic patient attempts to smoke,
he typically exhibits poor control over actions, and has difficulty
in movement selection, which is compatible with slow, incor-
rect, and ineffective motor acts (“put a match to the mouth
in an attempt to smoke”, Pick, 1905). Given that the patient
showed intact knowledge of functional uses of objects and a
disturbance of the mental control of deliberate motor actions,
Pick interpreted this disorder as a sign of apraxia. The patient
generally recognizes that the action performed does not unfold as
expected, and reports his disappointment. Phenomenologically,
we can distinguish at least two aspects interpretable in relation
to the sense of agency. The first aspect is a disorder of volitional
movement where non volitional movement is spared. In the
first description of apraxia, Jackson (1866) observed the core
pathology as a motor purposeful deficit [“the patient seems to
have lost much of his power to do anything intentionally, even
with those muscles that are not paralyzed”]. The second aspect,
related to the first, is the incapacity to select the correct action
leads to a weak power over the outcome itself. Apraxic patients
not only have problems with purposeful object manipulation in
everyday activities, but also in selecting actions (Rumiati et al.,
2001), demonstrating impairments not related to mere move-
ment execution (Hermsdörfer, 2014), nor to a loss of functional
semantic knowledge or resource limitation (Rumiati, 2014). In
motor act selection, patients with apraxia lose much of their
power to perform intentional actions, are more prone to errors
and have typically prolonged response times compared to neu-
rological controls without apraxia (Goldenberg and Hagmann,
1998; Goldenberg et al., 2004; Hermsdörfer et al., 2006; Rumiati,
2014). The fragility of the deliberate control of their own actions
may substantially depend on the interference caused by the com-
petition between varieties of degraded movements (Sirigu et al.,
2004; Pazzaglia et al., 2008b; Botvinick et al., 2009; Buxbaum
and Kalenine, 2010; Jax and Buxbaum, 2010; Nelissen et al.,
2010). Thus, weakened movement representation impedes correct
and fast action selection processing by reducing freedom and
power in selecting between possible movement options, thereby
contributing to a reduced fluency (Haggard and Chambon, 2012,
for a review) and sense of agency over one’s own action effects
(Wenke et al., 2010). Consistent with a deficit that implies
a failure to select or retrieve stored internal representations,
apraxia should affect the subjective perception of generated
actions.
Another evidence is the disorder of self-generated action
essential to establishing a sense of agency. A seminal paper showed
experimentally that a sample of patients who had developed
apraxic symptoms exhibited deficits in judging whether they did
or did not cause a specific movement of their own body (Sirigu
et al., 1999). With a more traditional experimental paradigm
such as the explicit attribution in agency task, the patients were
asked to execute simple and complex hand–finger movements
with their unseen, gloved hand, and to observe in real time hand
movements relayed on a video display. The display showed either
the patient’s own hand or that of a model who performed the
same movements. The apraxic patients were selectively impaired
in deciding whether the hand moving on the screen was their own
or belonged to someone else and become aware of their decision
with a significant delay compared to healthy participants (Sirigu
et al., 2004).
Different authors questioned the validity of these explicit
judgments when studying agency, suggesting a more reliable,
implicit quantitative measure for the awareness of action based
on an intriguing relationship between voluntary action and sub-
jective time (Haggard et al., 2002). This so-called “intentional
binding” measure has been studied in patients with cortico-
basal degeneration, some with clinical apraxia (Wolpe et al.,
2014). Participants were asked to report either when they pressed
a button or when they heard a tone. In the case of apraxic
patients the intentional binding is associated with a subjec-
tive contraction of time between an action and its effect. This
change in judgment is proportional to disease severity of apraxia
but not to other motor features or cognitive impairments and
occurs for the reduced sense of ownership of the action (Wolpe
et al., 2014). Increased binding of action in patients is there-
fore more likely to reflect a deficit in control of actions by
the anticipation of their effects. This possibility is explored
by closer examination of action prediction in patients with
apraxia.
The third evidence are disordered predictive signals, which are
critical to the sense of agency (Blakemore et al., 2001). According
to the “comparator” model, one makes a choice on the basis of a
match between the predicted and actual sensory effect of one’s
action (Chambon et al., 2013). It is possible that in previous
studies, patients failed to compare between an internal model
and the expected and actual sensory consequence of the action
(Sirigu et al., 2004). Indeed, patients with apraxia are unable
to mentally simulate movements of their own hands, (Sirigu
et al., 1995) and in monitoring the early phases of movement
planning (Sirigu et al., 2004), thus suggesting an impairment
in anticipating the sensory consequences of manual movements.
The readiness potential (RP), a marker of motor preparation that
increases just before an observed movement (Kilner et al., 2003),
was explored using electroencephalography in an elegant study on
apraxic patients (Sirigu et al., 2004; Fontana et al., 2012). Apraxic
patients passively viewed a series of short video clips showing
a predictable hand moving on the basis of changes of colored
objects. The results revealed a clear association between deficits
typically present in patients with apraxia and the alteration
to monitor the early planning phases of self-generated actions.
Specifically, instead of showing the marker of motor preparation
to self-generated movement observation-related events that was
exhibited in control participants, no such RP was observed in
patients with apraxia. Research has revealed that RP results from
forward model predictions of the motor system precisely auto-
matically preceding the movement’s onset (Kilner et al., 2003).
Within this context, the lack of RP exhibited by patients indi-
cates that the inability to predict the consequences of one’s own
motor actions lead to inadequate online updating during actions
(Pazzaglia, 2013a,b). The online information about movement
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is a prerequisite for the capacity to feel that one’s own body
generates the event and has control over it and the discrepancy
between the predicted and actual sensory feedback is directly
associated to a distorted phenomenology in the experience of
agency.
Separately, the results from these studies reaffirm the objec-
tive difficulty in voluntary control of action and thereby its
consequences by predictive mechanisms, and the ever-expanding
apraxia picture on perturbation of agentive awareness. Despite
few direct studies on agency, the disorder of the processes promot-
ing agency that may co-occur in apraxia could fully explain the
higher-order computations (e.g., related to intention to act and
to the experience of controlling one’s own actions, and, through
them, events in the outside world) that likely interact with low-
level motor mechanisms (e.g., the automatic selection of action
primitives on which conscious experience corresponding to effi-
ciency of action selection is based). This hypothetical processing,
necessary to account the different form of apraxia observed, may
be predicted on the basis of an internal model (see Figure 1)
that attributes, evaluates, controls, or predicts the consequences
of one’s own actions, and compares these predictions to actual
outcomes.
DOES AGENCY PLAY A CRUCIAL CAUSATIVE ROLE IN THE
LEFT FRONTAL–PARIETAL NETWORK?
By examining both fMRI data on voluntary actions that are
usually accompanied by an experience of agency and data on
the anatomical localization of altered awareness and the control
of volitional action in apraxia, it is possible to begin uncovering
the neural substrates related to the sense of agency. FMRI allows
the detection of brain activity changes that are correlated with
motor intentions and subsequent action monitoring. It does not,
however, clarify whether such activations play a causal role. In
contrast, lesion-mapping analysis can highlight brain areas or cir-
cuits actively involved in the process of deriving actions from the
original intention and plan of the movement. Several fMRI studies
have suggested that the sense of agency, including action monitor-
ing (Matsuzawa et al., 2005; Schnell et al., 2007; Farrer et al., 2008;
Kontaris et al., 2009; Tsakiris et al., 2010; Chambon et al., 2013;
Koban et al., 2013), prediction (Leube et al., 2003b; Ramnani
and Miall, 2004; Spengler et al., 2009; Yomogida et al., 2010;
Nahab et al., 2011), self-other coding (Blakemore et al., 1998;
Leube et al., 2003a; Balslev et al., 2006; David et al., 2006, 2007;
Ogawa and Inui, 2007; Fukushima et al., 2013; Lee and Reeve,
2013), and intentional binding (Kühn et al., 2013; Moore et al.,
2013) involve the exchange of signals across a frontal–parietal
network that voxel-based lesion symptom mapping (VLSM) anal-
ysis demonstrated is typically affected in apraxia (Pazzaglia et al.,
2008a,b; Dovern et al., 2011). In particular, the posterior parietal
cortex (PPC; Fink et al., 1999; Chaminade and Decety, 2002;
Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003b, 2008; Chaminade
et al., 2005) and the angular gyrus (AG) monitor signals related
to action selection in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the
ventral premotor cortex (vPM) to prospectively signal subjective
experience control over a coming action (Grossman et al., 2000;
Leube et al., 2003a; Pelphrey et al., 2004; Ramnani and Miall,
2004; Saxe et al., 2004).
FIGURE 1 | Hypothetical model for performing and recognizing
self-produced movements. The model has been adapted from Rothi and
Heilman (1997) within the internal model adapted from Sirigu et al. (2003).
Failures in performing or in recognizing gestures may occur because of
damage at any stage in the directional flow of action between perceiving
(input) and performing (output) an action. Successful completion of any
gesture-related task (e.g., execution, imitation or recognition of either
correctly or incorrectly, transitive (using objects) or intransitive (without
objects) meaningful conventional limb gestures, etc.) requires access to an
internal model. A prominent theory in motor control proposes the use of
internal models with capacity to control or predict the consequences of
one’s own actions, and comparing these predictions to actual outcomes
(Wolpert et al., 1995) adapted from Sirigu et al. (2003) to the putative level
of dysfunction in apraxia. An efference copy of the motor command is used
by forward models to predict the sensory feedback. The discrepancy
between the predicted and actual sensory feedback is directly associated to
a distorted phenomenology in the experience of agency. Hhypothetical
models for performing and recognizing self-produced movements highlight
the role of an internal model that attributes, evaluates, controls, or predicts
the consequences of one’s own actions, and compares these predictions to
actual outcomes.
Healthy subjects report a decreased sense of agency when their
intentions do not match the outcomes of their actions. In this
case, activity in the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and AG
regions increased as a function of the degree of retrospective
action-intention mismatch (Farrer et al., 2008; Spengler et al.,
2009), and might represent a self-indicator of volition prior to
movement itself (Chambon et al., 2013). Therefore, direct elec-
trical stimulation applied to the parietal cortex (AG and supra-
marginal gyrus, SMG) in patients undergoing awake surgery for
tumor removal elicits the subjective experience of an “intention
to move” the contralesional hand, arm, or foot (Desmurget et al.,
2009).
Direct evidence of the anatomical and functional association
on three different levels (the choice of action where ambiguity
is present; self-perception/intentional binding; and the intention
to act) has been obtained in patients with apraxia. Neurological
investigations into the intention to move in apraxic participants
have shown that the AG, in the inferior parietal lobule of the
parietal cortex, may be essential for anticipating the multisen-
sory consequences of predicted movements (Sirigu et al., 2004;
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FIGURE 2 | Summary of the functional and anatomical link between the
essential aspects of agency and apraxia. This figure describes some of the
objective measures of agency obtained in patients with apraxia: (A) The
“intentional binding” paradigm, in particular the chronometric approach for
volition. (B) The “self vs. other” paradigm, specifically the differentiation of
self-generated movements from experimenter-generated actions. (C) The
“selection of action paradigm”, particularly the feeling of less power over
efficacy of one’s own action. (D) The “neural intention to act” in which EEG
signals were recorded while the subjects passively watched a series of short
videos showing the voluntary actions of an actor’s hand. The central brain
illustration depicts the critical brain areas for apraxia, which are alluded to in
these paradigms. MFG = middle frontal gyrus, SMA = supplementary motor
area, IFG = inferior frontal gyrus, insula, IPL = inferior parietal lobe, SMG =
supra marginal gyrus, AG = angular gyrus.
Fontana et al., 2012). Similarly, both frontal and parietal struc-
tures may differentially code for self-generated actions as well as
for action selection (Sirigu et al., 1999; Pazzaglia et al., 2008b).
Patients with apraxia, who systematically identified the hand of
a model that performed their same movement as their own,
demonstrated mainly fronto-parietal lesions (Sirigu et al., 1999).
A clear association was identified between the impairment in
selection of four versions of actions to the gesture-sound with
lesions mainly involving the inferior parietal region, SMG, and
AG, but also extending as far as the frontal lobe (Pazzaglia et al.,
2008b). Yet, impairments in correct selection of three versions
of the same visual gesture presented within the same trial were
related to the gray matter volume of the left anterior inferior
parietal cortex extending into the posterior superior temporal
gyrus (Nelissen et al., 2010).
Another circuit, anchored in the frontal lobe involving the sup-
plementary motor area (SMA) and its most anterior portion, the
pre-SMA (Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003a,b; Haggard
and Clark, 2003; Haggard and Whitford, 2004; Cunnington et al.,
2006; Lau et al., 2006), together with the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (Fink et al., 1999; Slachevsky et al., 2001; Schnell et al.,
2007; Synofzik et al., 2008), has been proposed to play a role in
intentional binding and the judgment of agency, as has the insula
(Karnath and Baier, 2010). Only recent behavioral, structural,
and functional results converge to reveal the frontal network
for altered awareness and the control of voluntary actions in
patients with apraxia (Wolpe et al., 2014). Structural neuroimag-
ing of voxel-based morphometry and diffusion tensor imaging
showed that the volitional signals that drive internally generated
actions in an intentional binding task were modulated by gray
and white matter degeneration in the medial frontal-prefrontal
network, with its hub in the pre-SMA (Wolpe et al., 2014). In
apraxic patients, the dorsal premotor cortex may be essential for
intentionally retrieving motor knowledge (Dovern et al., 2011).
Although a substantial proportion of right-hemisphere damaged
patients also showed apraxia (Donkervoort et al., 2000), involve-
ment of the right hemisphere lesions to the sense of agency is
currently lacking. Thus, two regions in the left hemisphere process
different information (Figure 2), while the parietal lobe’s prin-
cipal functions might be to self-monitor motor intentions, the
frontal lobe might be directly involved in forming, monitoring,
and control intentions. Nonetheless, other cortical areas, such
as the insula (Pazzaglia et al., 2008a,b), have been implicated
in selecting different actions, so that the agentic experience in
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apraxia is likely to be sustained by a distributed left brain network
rather than by a single brain center. For a schematic representa-
tion of the functional and anatomical link between the essential
aspects of agency and apraxia see Figure 2.
AUTOMATIC RETRIEVAL STRATEGIES IN THERAPY FOR
APRAXIA REHABILITATION
The loss of a sense of control over one’s own movements plays, in
apraxic patients, an important role in many purposeful actions
that are an inherent part of daily life. It affects the self-care
routines (Foundas et al., 1995; Hanna-Pladdy et al., 2003; Walker
et al., 2004; Smania et al., 2006) with respect to, for example,
personal hygiene (Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998), preparing
food (van Heugten et al., 2006), eating (Foundas et al., 1995), and
dressing (Walker et al., 2004). Occasionally, the inability to predict
the consequences of one’s own motor acts can have devastating
effects that jeopardize the autonomy and safety of the individual
(Giovannetti et al., 2002; Hanna-Pladdy et al., 2003; Bettcher
et al., 2011). A person with apraxia might be able to safely eat
candy, but when attempting to smoke, risks getting burnt on the
palm of the hand, cheeks, or elsewhere. From an adaptive point of
view, intentional selection about incorrect actions could be deeply
pervasive in a patient’s life, and sometimes dangerous for their
own safety (Hanna-Pladdy et al., 2003).
It is clear that progress in understanding action awareness
and control represents a significant opportunity to strengthen
the automatic rather than intentional retrieval strategies in
the treatment of apraxic patients. After a stroke, patients with
apraxia must increase the capacity to automatically retrieve
learned motor knowledge by restoring the congruency between
sensory-motor and intention systems. The prospective sense of
agency might only develop once the brain has automatically
re-learned. Matching or mismatching between visual but also
multimodal signals and motor output re-stabilizes the relation
between actions and outcomes. Automatically re-learning the
appropriate responses to familiar action situations using closely
associated perceptual-motor codes permits patients with apraxia
to improve their selection of action (Smania et al., 2006), and thus
function independently, but also, more importantly, can block
the generation of unsafe motor patterns (Hanna-Pladdy et al.,
2003).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Taken together, the studies discussed in our perspective article
seem to reveal a picture of apraxia that, although probably still
incomplete, demonstrates how altered mechanisms that underlie
awareness and control can be detrimental to agency. As such,
these studies disclose more about agency itself. The prospective
framework we offer here for apraxia renew the interpretation of
the puzzling aspect generally viewed as apraxia, and encourage
the advancement of novel and effective treatments to cure the
disorder. Moreover, for agency, we provided support for the
existence of a left parietal–frontal network underlying agentive
self-awareness that continues to be a valuable way for gathering
conclusive evidence on the role of agency in motor control and
cognition as a natural part of human life, and thus provide
ecologically valid data. Future studies focusing specifically on
the thematic content of the sense of agency (e.g., related to the
control of one’s own action or to intention to act to social and
cultural conditions in which the idea of responsibility is central
for our own actions) may help to understand the wide and
complex range of human actions in both normal and pathological
conditions.
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